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WILL THE SEC SURVIVE FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM?
Renee M. Jones*
ABSTRACT
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) conspicuous failures
during the financial crisis of 2008 have led many to question the agency’s
relevance in the modern financial era. Some commentators have called for the
creation of new super-agencies to assume a substantial portion of the SEC’s
duties. Others highlight enforcement failures and question the agency’s
commitment to its investor protection mission. Despite its recent missteps and
persistent calls for regulatory overhaul, the SEC’s future seems secure for now
as President Obama’s reform proposals (the “Obama Plan”) as currently
conceived preserve the agency’s independence.
Although thus far the Obama Plan protects the SEC’s status as an
independent agency, several aspects of the plan threaten the agency’s long-
term prospects. The proposal to expand the executive branch’s role in
oversight over financial institutions may represent the beginning of an
incremental encroachment on SEC authority. Similarly, the proposed
Consumer Financial Protection Agency could absorb a portion of the SEC’s
traditional investor protection role. In the end, the SEC’s survival depends on
whether its leadership takes effective action to restore its credibility and
regain the public trust in the years to come.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is currently under
siege. Its once stellar reputation has been tarnished by a series of inauspicious
events that unfolded during the financial meltdown of 2008. The agency’s
passivity during the collapse of Bear Stearns, its failure to detect Bernard
Madoff’s massive fraud, and the failure of the Consolidated Supervised Entity
program for financial conglomerates have led many to question the agency’s
competence and relevance in the era of modern globalized financial markets.1
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Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against Regulation, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289 (2009); Jill
E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785 (2009). In addition, a slew of
government reports have assessed the SEC’s most glaring errors. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED WITHIN THE SEC’S DIVISION OF
ENFORCEMENT (2009), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2009/467.pdf; U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATION OF THE FAILURE OF THE SEC TO
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME, PUBLIC VERSION (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., RE-
INVESTIGATION OF CLAIMS BY GARY AGUIRRE OF IMPROPER PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND RETALIATORY
TERMINATION (2008), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg100708.pdf.
2. As of this writing, the U.S. House of Representatives has passed a financial reform bill that
largely reflects the proposals included in the Obama Plan. The Senate financial bill is still in the early stages
of development, but in its current form it departs sharply from the model set forth in the Obama Plan and
the House bill.
Even before the agency’s recent mishaps came to light, its future was
uncertain as reform advocates vigorously campaigned to rein in its powers. A
sheaf of reports released in 2006 and 2007 recommended curtailing the
agency’s vast powers by creating new financial agencies or embracing broader
industry self-regulation. Through proposed agency mergers, transfers of
authority, and alternative regulatory methods, reform advocates sought to
blunt the SEC’s critical enforcement and oversight functions.
Despite these looming threats, sober analysis suggests that the SEC is
destined to survive regulatory reform and will likely emerge as a stronger and
more capable regulator. The Obama Administration’s plan for financial reform
(the “Obama Plan”) resists calls for regulatory consolidation. If Congress
adopts the Obama Plan’s proposals, the SEC’s authority over corporate
governance, hedge funds, and over-the-counter derivatives will expand.  This2
expansion of SEC authority is an appropriate response to recent turmoil in the
financial markets, as a strong and independent SEC remains a cornerstone of
an effective financial regulatory regime.
II. ROOTS OF RECENT FAILURES
To intelligently assess the SEC’s future we must first take stock of the
factors that contributed to the agency’s poor performance in the period leading
up to and throughout the duration of the 2008 financial crisis. This section
identifies the principal factors contributing to SEC malaise, which include
external constraints on SEC authority, leadership failures, and a misplaced
trust in financial institutions’ ability to manage risk and safeguard the
economy.
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3. For a more detailed discussion of how Congress and the courts have constrained SEC
independence, see generally Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: the Case for Regulatory
Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273 (2009).
4. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 16 & 18 U.S.C.). For a more detailed discussion of the impact of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, see Renee M. Jones, Back to Basics: Why Financial Regulatory Overhaul is
Overrated, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 391 (2010); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of
Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 963, 975–78 (2009).
A. External Constraints
One factor that contributed to the SEC’s recent failures is the erosion of
its independence and authority at the hands of Congress and the courts.  The3
cumulative impact of budgetary threats, pressure from Congress, and a series
of adverse federal court decisions thwarted important SEC initiatives aimed
at increasing oversight of financial firms, hedge funds, mutual funds, and
auditors. These external constraints help explain the SEC’s passivity in the
face of the rapidly emerging 2008 financial crisis.
1. Congress
Part of the blame for the SEC’s failures lies with Congress, which for the
past few decades has pursued a deregulatory agenda that limited the SEC’s
power to address several of the major causes of the financial crisis. Broad
legislative restrictions disabled the SEC from adequately overseeing the new
financial conglomerates that financial deregulation had unleashed. Congress
also banned the SEC and Commodities Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”) from regulating or monitoring transactions involving credit default
swaps and other over-the-counter derivatives—another major contributor to
the financial crisis. These statutory reforms left the SEC ill-equipped to
address the principal causes of the 2008 credit crisis: financial firms’
excessive risks, and the interconnectedness and interdependencies created by
unregulated trading in credit default swaps.
Perhaps the most harmful legislative restriction on the SEC’s authority
was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which eliminated the traditional
barrier between investment banking and commercial banks.  This new law4
denied the SEC authority to oversee investment bank conglomerates, a power
that may have equipped the agency to better control the systemic risks such
firms posed for the economy. After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the major U.S.
investment banks became part of sprawling financial conglomerates that lay
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5. John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better
Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 718 (2009).
6. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34428 (June 21, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200 and 240).
7. See Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2008, at A1; Poser, supra note 1, at 303; Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-30.htm (Cox stated that the CSE program was fundamentally
flawed because the SEC lacked authority to compel firms to comply with its guidance.); Coffee & Sale,
supra note 5, at 736–46. But see Sirri Defends Against Charges SEC Allowed Outsized Leverage at Firms,
41 SEC. REG. & L. REP., at 651 (Apr. 13, 2009) (quoting Erik Sirri, the former director the SEC’s Division
of Market and Trading, as stating that SEC could not have prevented financial firms’ failures due to limited
powers prior to and under the CSE).
8. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, Appendix E (2000).
9. Rick Schmitt, Prophet and Loss, STANFORD MAGAZINE, Mar.-Apr. 2009, available at
http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2009/marapr/features/born.html (describing CFTC
Chairman Brooksley Born’s unsuccessful battle against her Clinton administration counterparts to regulate
trading in credit default swaps).
10. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, Appendix E (2000) (codified as CFMA §§ 103, 105, 302,
303).
11. David W. Porteous & James G. Martignon, Credit Default Swaps: Regulatory Storm Clouds
Brewing, 40 SEC. REG. L. REPT. (BNA), at 2070 (Dec. 15, 2008).
12. Id. See also DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST 90–91 (2009) (describing the New York Federal
Reserve’s efforts to clear backlog in the documentation of CDSs).
beyond the SEC’s regulatory grasp.  Although the SEC retained authority over5
the broker-dealer subsidiaries of these firms, no regulator had power to police
the entities as a whole. This gaping regulatory chasm eventually led the SEC
to create the Consolidated Supervised Entity (“CSE”) program for investment
bank holding companies.  Most observers, including former SEC Chairman6
Christopher Cox, have concluded in hindsight that the CSE program was a
failure.7
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”)  also8
limited the SEC’s ability to address the increasing importance of derivatives
in the trading markets—another root cause of the financial crisis. Congress
enacted the CFMA to block the CFTC from altering its treatment of over the
counter (“OTC”) derivatives, as its then-Chairman Brooksley Born had
proposed.  The CFMA forbids the CFTC and the SEC from regulating credit9
default swaps (“CDS”) and other forms of OTC derivatives.10
After the CFMA, activity in CDS and other derivatives trading
exploded.  This unregulated market was rife with problems, including poor11
documentation, lack of transparency and difficulties in assessing collateral
adequacy and counterparty risk exposure.  The systemic risks created by12
unregulated trading in credit default swaps led to the downfall of Bear Stearns,
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13. See Frontline: The Warning, transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
warning/ (quoting Brooksley Born, Arthur Levitt and Gary Gensler).
14. See DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 172–74 (2007);
Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1097
(2007).
15. ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 236–43 (2002).
16. Id. at 130–39, 236–43.
17. Id. at 130–33 (describing corporate opposition to the SEC’s proposed auditor independence
rules).
18. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (2006).
Lehman Brothers, and AIG and threatened to destabilize the entire economy.
With the benefit of hindsight, many key participants in the showdown with
Chairman Born have come to regret the failure to regulate CDS in the 1990s.13
In addition to legislative constraints on SEC power, Congress employed
indirect pressure to discourage the SEC from adopting regulatory policies that
industry groups opposed. Perhaps the most vivid example of Congress’s
interference in financial regulatory matters occurred in 1993 when the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) with SEC support moved to
adopt new accounting standards requiring corporations to expense employee
stock options.  The major audit firms and high tech industry leaders opposed14
this change to the accounting rules. They argued that option expensing would
impose unreasonable burdens on start-up firms and weaken their ability to
attract new talent. In response to political pressure, several congressmen,
including Senator Joseph Lieberman, introduced bills to stop FASB from
adopting the standard.  Although FASB finally adopted its proposed15
accounting treatment in 2005, congressional pressure on the SEC and FASB
created prolonged delays.
Members of Congress also resorted to budgetary threats in attempts to
persuade the SEC to drop support for other new rules that lobbyists opposed.
For example, when SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt proposed new rules for
auditor independence, congressmen bombarded him with letters and phone
calls opposing the initiative.  This pressure caused Levitt to compromise on16
the proposal for fear of jeopardizing the agency’s budgetary support.17
2. Federal Courts
In addition to congressional efforts to curb its authority, the SEC has
faced debilitating wing-clipping at the hands of the federal courts. Two
important new SEC rules were overturned by federal courts during the last
decade. In Goldstein v. SEC,  the D.C. Circuit Court rejected a new SEC rule18
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19. Hedge funds were among the most active participants in the CDS market. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATORS AND MARKET PARTICIPANTS ARE TAKING STEPS
TO STRENGTHEN MARKET DISCIPLINE, BUT CONTINUED ATTENTION IS NEEDED (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08200.pdf.
20. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,
443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
21. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 136.
22. Chamber of Commerce, 443 F.3d at 908.
23. For a broader discussion of the adverse impact of intrusive judicial review of agency rulemaking
see Jones, supra note 3, at 1324–33 (describing the dangers of aggressive judicial review of SEC
rulemaking).
24. Id.
25. Jesse Westbrook, SEC to Delay Proxy-Access Rule, Giving Banks Reprieve, BLOOMBERG.COM,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a2ZCxme0W84Y.
26. Kara Scannell & Susanne Craig, SEC Chief under Fire as Fed Seeks Bigger Wall Street
that required hedge fund managers to register as investment advisers. If
upheld, this rule would have allowed the SEC to gather information on hedge
fund trading activities, which in turn may have equipped regulators to better
perceive the systemic risks posed by CDSs.19
Likewise, in Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,  the D.C. Circuit Court20
twice rejected an SEC rule that required greater independence on mutual fund
boards. In its first decision on the matter, the court ruled that the SEC had
failed to adequately consider the costs of the new rule.  The same court later21
rejected a re-promulgation of the same rule because the SEC had not allowed
time for additional public comment.22
The impact of adverse court decisions such as Goldstein and Chamber of
Commerce extends beyond the rules they overturn. Such opinions have the
more insidious effect of diminishing the SEC’s regulatory vigor.  For fear of23
legal challenges, the agency adopts a more cautious stance and may avoid
adopting new rules that promise to provoke controversy.  This phenomenon24
likely accounts for the SEC’s current reticence to move forward on proxy
access rules. The agency recently announced it would defer action on the
access proposals preventing them from taking effect for the upcoming 2010
proxy season.25
B. Mission Failure
Another factor in the SEC’s weak response to the emerging financial
crisis was inept leadership at the Commission. By all accounts, Chairman Cox
was unusually passive as the large investment banks within his purview
faltered.  The regulatory dormancy engendered by the Chairman’s approach26
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Role—Cox Draws Criticism Low-Key Leadership During Bear Crisis, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2008, at A1;
WESSEL, supra note 12, at 157 (describing federal regulators’ decision to exclude Cox from discussions on
the Bear Stearns rescue). According to Wessel’s reporting, “top officials at both the Fed and the Treasury
had decided the SEC and its Chairman weren’t up to the job of coping with the collapse of an investment
bank.” Id.
27. Scannell & Craig, supra note 26; see generally WESSEL, supra note 12.
28. See supra text and discussion at note 23.
29. Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
2006).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 129.
allowed problems in the financial markets to fester, eventually requiring
urgent intervention by Treasury and the Federal Reserve.27
1. Putting the Brakes on Rulemaking
Chairman Cox took office on the heels of his predecessor William
Donaldson’s attempts to complete a regulatory agenda formulated in response
to the 2001–2002 governance scandals. Focal points of Donaldson’s efforts
were governance problems at operating companies, mutual funds, and within
the hedge fund industry. Through litigation and litigation threats, corporate
interest groups ultimately thwarted many of these regulatory initiatives.28
Although Cox might have opted to pursue the regulatory agenda that
Donaldson laid out, he instead adopted a decidedly passive stance on
corporate governance reforms. The controversy surrounding shareholder
proxy access that engulfed the agency in 2007 exemplifies Cox’s reluctance
to engage in proactive regulation.
The SEC took up the proxy access in early 2007, three years after
Chairman Donaldson’s efforts to forge SEC consensus on the issue had failed.
Corporate governance activists had advocated for years, without success, for
the right to access the corporate-funded proxy statement to propose
shareholder nominees for a corporation’s board of directors. After the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in AFSCME v. SEC,  the SEC revisited its29
position on proxy access. In AFSCME v. SEC,  the Second Circuit Court of30
Appeals rejected the SEC’s interpretation of Rule 14a-8 to prevent
shareholders from submitting proxy access bylaw amendments for inclusion
in a company’s proxy statement. The court found that by allowing companies
to exclude such proposals that the SEC had reversed its earlier position
without adequate explanation.  The regulatory uncertainty that the AFSCME31
ruling created prompted the SEC to develop a proposal that would allow
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32. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Shareholder Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. 43466 (July 27,
2007); Securities and Exchange Commission, Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors,
72 Fed. Reg. 43488 (July 27, 2007).
33. See generally WESSEL, supra note 12. IN FED WE TRUST is a chronicle of Chairman Bernanke’s
and Secretary Paulson’s actions as the financial meltdown unfolded. Notable in his account is the absence
of any significant action by Cox or the SEC during the failure of three major investment banking firms.
34. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:
GREATER ATTENTION NEEDED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES IN THE
DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09358.pdf [hereinafter
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE].
shareholders to use Rule 14a-8 to submit proposals to amend corporate bylaws
to provide for proxy access.
While this proposal was under development, the staff produced an
eleventh-hour alternative “no-access” proposal that restored the SEC’s pre-
AFSCME position on the matter, prohibiting shareholder proposals that sought
to impose proxy access. Chairman Cox supported this last-minute maneuver
to release the “no-access” proposal alongside the proposal to permit
shareholder access bylaws and he later cast the deciding vote on the
Commission in favor of the “no-access” proposal.32
Chairman Cox also let the clock run out on the SEC proposals to require
greater independence on mutual fund boards after Chamber of Commerce, and
chose not revisit hedge fund regulation after the court’s rebuke in Goldstein.
This Cox-engendered passivity on corporate governance matters reduced the
SEC’s relevance in financial oversight, leaving it to the Federal Reserve and
the Treasury Department to step in to fill the void as the financial crisis
unfolded.33
2. Enforcement Division Missteps
Not only did Chairman Cox reverse course on governance reform, he also
presided over the diminution in the stature and effectiveness of the SEC’s
Division of Enforcement. In the post-Enron era, the SEC had become more
aggressive in its enforcement practices, but retreated dramatically during
Chairman Cox’s term. As the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
noted, the aggregate amount of SEC penalties fell from $1.59 billion in 2005
(the beginning of Chairman Cox’s term) to $256 million in 2008.34
Many suspect that new policies advanced by Cox contributed to this
decline. In 2006, the Commission adopted a controversial policy that
questioned the appropriateness of corporate-level penalties. Then, in 2007, the
SEC initiated a “Pilot Program” requiring enforcement staff to consult with
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35. DONNA NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT (2008).
36. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 34.
37. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Address to Practising Law
Institute’s “SEC Speaks in 2009” Program (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2009/spch020609mls.htm; Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General
Government, 111th Cong. (June 2, 2009) (statement of Hon. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Securities
and Exchange Comm’n), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts060209mls.htm.
38. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in Search of
a Story (Sept. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1475433 (assessing the factors that led to the
enforcement staff’s ineffectiveness). See also Poser, supra note 1.
39. See Securities and Exchange Commission Office of Inspector General, Program Improvements
Needed Within the SEC’s Division of Enforcement (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/
Reports/AuditsInspections/2009/467.pdf.
40. See Jones, supra note 3; see also James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American
Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of U.S. Securities
Law, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 164 (Mar. 30, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1370508
(providing empirical support for these suspicions); Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry:
Evidence from Enforcement against Broker-Dealers (Aug. 11, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1333717.
the Commission before engaging in settlement discussions with corporate
counsel.  The GAO concluded that these policies and practices caused the35
enforcement staff to retreat in its pursuit of corporate penalties due to the
Commission’s unwillingness to accept staff recommendations for such
sanctions.  SEC chair Mary Schapiro abolished the Pilot Program in 2009,36
and pledged to work to address enforcement staff concerns regarding their
autonomy and authority.37
Another barrier to the Enforcement Division’s effectiveness was a level
of dysfunction that seems to have gripped the agency. Conflicts of interest,
fear of powerful parties, and favoritism toward high-profile attorneys and their
firms interfered with the Enforcement Division’s impartial enforcement of
securities laws.  As the SEC Inspector General has reported, the enforcement38
staff followed an ad hoc approach to following up on tips and in deciding
when to initiate investigations or bring them to conclusion.  This ad hoc39
approach left enforcement attorneys vulnerable to manipulation and
intimidation by their supervisors and by the targets of their investigations. The
Inspector General’s reports on Gary Agguire and the Madoff fraud, as well as
the Enforcement Division generally, all support suspicions that a potential
target’s perceived clout can influence the outcome of SEC investigations.40
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41. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34428 (June 21, 2004).
42. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SEC’S OVERSIGHT
OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM (Sept. 25,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/2008/446-a.pdf.
3. Failure of the Self-Regulation Paradigm
No post-mortem on the SEC’s recent mishaps would be complete without
accounting for the failure of the SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entity
(“CSE”) program, which was adopted to fill a regulatory void created by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the SEC retained
authority over the broker-dealer arms of these financial conglomerates, but no
regulator had authority at the holding company level.
The lack of federal regulation at the holding company level created
problems for these firms as the European Union’s (“EU”) Financial
Conglomerates Directive of 2002 (the “Directive”) required regulatory
supervision of financial holding companies. The Directive exempted foreign
firms from its regulatory rules as long as the firm was supervised by an EU-
approved regulator. Thus, the large investment banks’ freedom to do business
in the EU depended on some form of holding company regulation.
The SEC and the large investment banks lobbied Congress to grant the
SEC supervisory authority over large financial holding companies. After
Congress declined to act, the firms persuaded the SEC to create the CSE
program.  The big five investment banks (at the time)—Bear Stearns, Merrill41
Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley—joined the
program, which was designed to function like the Federal Reserve’s oversight
of bank holding companies. The objective was to reduce the likelihood that
weaknesses in holding companies would put regulated entities or the broader
financial system at risk.
When the CSE program was terminated four years later, three of the five
firms in the program had failed. Bear Stearns was sold to JPMorgan in a fire
sale, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and Merrill Lynch was snapped
up by Bank of America to stave off its imminent collapse. Soon thereafter, the
two surviving investment banks, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, opted
out of the CSE program by electing bank holding company status and Federal
Reserve supervision, after which the SEC officially abandoned the program.
One factor in the CSE program’s failure was the reality that the CSE
program was woefully understaffed.  Only twenty-five SEC staff members42
were assigned to the program, with only three examiners for each of the five
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43. See Coffee & Sale, supra note 5, at 741–45.
44. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 42.
45. See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2008, at B1.
46. Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release: Chairman Cox Announces End of
Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2008/2008-230.htm.
47. Id.
participating firms. The SEC’s staff was overmatched by the firms’ own
internal risk specialists, and the SEC could neither closely monitor capital
adequacy nor compel specific action to address identified risks.  Due to the43
voluntary nature of the program, staffers had to negotiate liquidity levels and
leverage ratios with each firm, and the SEC’s only recourse in the event of
dispute was to threaten to ban the firm from participating in the program.44
Another fundamental flaw in the CSE program was its misplaced faith in
financial firms’ ability to control risks despite the intense short-term
incentives to embrace risk as a way of boosting profits. This program’s faith
in self-regulation and market discipline has been more broadly incorporated
into financial regulatory policies. Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the CFMA both
reflected regulators’ judgment that market discipline was superior to
government regulation when dealing with sophisticated financial actors.
Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, perhaps the most ardent
adherent to the tenets of market discipline, now counts himself among many
recent converts who question the market’s ability to solve complex problems
of economic organization.45
Chairman Cox has joined Greenspan in questioning the power of self-
regulation. When announcing the suspension of the CSE program Cox noted,
“the last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation
does not work.”  Cox also conceded that the CSE program “was46
fundamentally flawed from the beginning, because investment banks could opt
in or out of supervision voluntarily. The fact that investment bank holding
companies could withdraw from this voluntary supervision at their discretion
diminished the perceived mandate of the CSE program, and weakened its
effectiveness.”47
III. THE ANTI-SEC CRUSADE
The SEC’s own shortcomings are not the only threat to the agency’s
continued viability. Another pressing challenge is hostility to the agency that
has flourished in the academic community for decades. Prominent
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48. HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A
PURPOSE (1979); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation:
A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (1994); A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time
for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073 (2005). Although the SEC’s academic critics have been
vocal, other commentators have come to the agency’s defense. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, The
Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 776 (2006); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF WALL STREET (3d ed. 2003); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as Lawmaker: Choices About Investor
Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591 (2006).
49. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L, No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered
sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) (2006) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley].
50. Sarbanes-Oxley § 404.
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commentators have published articles and books in recent years that question
the agency’s legitimacy and advocate for its demise.  These views have48
penetrated policy circles and are reflected in several prominent reform
proposals.
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Backlash
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) created a host of
new corporate governance restrictions and imposed new regulatory burdens
on corporations.  Section 404, its most controversial provision, requires49
management to assess annually the effectiveness of internal controls over
financial reporting and the independent auditor to attest to such assessments.50
Initial Section 404 implementation costs were estimated to average $4 million
per issuer.  These high compliance costs led many executives and51
commentators to criticize the provision.52
In the aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley, major U.S. business groups joined
forces to build a case for rolling back the Act’s most intrusive provisions and,
more generally, to promote financial deregulation. The cornerstone of these
efforts was the 2006 and 2007 release of three separate reports that presented
a similar array of recommendations for regulatory reform. The most prominent
of these reports was the Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation (“CCM Report”), which asserted that U.S. financial markets had
lost competitive ground to foreign securities markets, and that this decline was
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CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (Nov. 30, 2006).
54. Id.
55. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE
21ST CENTURY: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.capitalmarkets
commission.com/NR/rdonlyres/eozwwssfrqzdm3hd5siogqhp6h2ngxwdpr77qw2bogptzvi5weu6mmi4plf
q6xic7kjonfpg4q2bpks6ryog5wwh5sc/0703capmarkets_full.pdf.
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2007). Some examples of Sarbanes-Oxley criticism that is present in the Bloomberg-Schumer report include
the following quotes: “the flawed implementation of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act . . . has only aggravated
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Section 404 and operating in what they see as a complex and unpredictable legal and regulatory
environment.” Id. at 12.
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(Mar. 2008).
due in part to onerous regulation in the U.S., most notably Sarbanes-Oxley and
an overly intrusive SEC.53
To restore U.S. markets to their proper pre-eminent position, the CCM
Report recommended modifying the reach of Section 404, eliminating private
securities regulation, and shifting from the SEC’s command and control
apparatus toward increased self regulation for the stock markets.  Many of54
these recommendations were echoed in reports published by the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce  and a report from McKinsey and Company commissioned by55
New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Senator Charles Schumer.56
B. Regulatory Reform Models
While only a loose connection exists between these Sarbanes-Oxley
“backlash” advocates and proponents of financial regulatory overhaul, former
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson provides a crucial link. Early on, Secretary
Paulson applauded CCM’s efforts to assess Sarbanes-Oxley’s impact on U.S.
competitiveness. So closely was Secretary Paulson associated with the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation that the CCM Interim Report is
frequently referred to simply as the “Paulson Committee Report.”
In the spring of 2008, then-Secretary Paulson released the Treasury
Department’s “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure.”57
The Blueprint set forth a framework for restructuring financial regulation,
which included plans to scale back and ultimately abolish the SEC. The
Blueprint proposed eliminating (or shrinking) the SEC by dividing its powers
between two newly created agencies and transferring a chunk of its authority
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Regulation in the United States (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 09-19, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1300431; Elizabeth Brown, E Pluribus
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to self-regulatory organizations, including the stock exchanges. In the shorter
term, the Blueprint recommended that the SEC adopt the “principles-based”
or “soft” regulatory approach employed by the CFTC and an eventual merger
of the two agencies.
The Blueprint endorsed a structure advanced by the Twin Peaks model for
financial regulatory reform, which calls for financial regulation to be
organized around two principal objectives: prudential regulation and business
conduct regulation.  Because the SEC mission neither falls squarely within58
nor fully occupies either peak, its role within a Twin Peaks structure is murky
at best. In a pure Twin Peaks structure, the SEC’s current functions would
likely be performed as part of a larger agency’s regulatory charge.
Another popular alternative to the Twin Peaks structure would also hasten
the SEC’s demise. Some U.S. commentators have called for the creation of a
universal regulator for all financial institutions modeled upon the U.K.’s
recent financial reforms.  The universal regulator would have jurisdiction59
over all significant financial firms, with securities regulation comprising a
mere subset of its duties. Although a version of the SEC might survive as a
“division” of the universal regulator, its independence and authority would
necessarily be diminished.
C. Consolidation Proposals May Destabilize the SEC
Advocates of regulatory restructuring have differing objectives than those
who advocate for financial deregulation. Consolidation advocates frequently
focus on questions of efficiency and regulatory effectiveness, while
deregulators, by definition, disfavor mandatory regulatory standards. These
distinctions tend to blur in the debate over regulatory reform as some overhaul
proposals, most notably the Blueprint, combine restructuring and deregulatory
proposals within a single package.
Regardless of their motivations, however, proponents of regulatory
consolidation have the effect of destabilizing the SEC’s position within the
regulatory fabric. Whether they aim to limit regulation or improve its
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effectiveness, most consolidation proposals would significantly alter the
SEC’s regulatory role. Because these proposals question both the capabilities
and the necessity of a stand-alone SEC, they pose a grave risk to the SEC’s
survival.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE SEC?—IT WILL SURVIVE
Although the decks were stacked against the SEC’s future prominence
when the financial crisis reached its nadir in the fall of 2008, at present, the
SEC’s prognosis is surprisingly strong. Rather than being subsumed or
decimated as many advocates had proposed, the agency appears to be making
efforts to reclaim its position as a premiere financial regulator.
The SEC’s new leadership has renewed its commitment to a traditional
investment protection mandate. On the rulemaking front, Chairman Mary
Schapiro has picked up the baton where Chairman Donaldson left it, taking up
proxy access, hedge fund regulation, and slowing momentum on the move to
International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) (one of Chairman Cox’s
favored projects). The SEC is likely to adopt some form of proxy access in
2010 and is moving to regulate hedge funds and derivatives with enhanced
legislative authority from Congress.60
Not only has SEC leadership committed to substantial governance
reforms, the Enforcement Division is undergoing significant restructuring.61
Robert Khuzami, a former federal prosecutor, became the agency’s new
enforcement director in February 2009.  Khuzami is reorganizing the division62
to increase the effectiveness and autonomy of line attorneys. Both Schapiro
and Khuzami have pledged to take heed of criticisms from the GAO and
Inspector General and are working to correct the problems revealed by their
investigations.63
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Despite these encouraging signals, the SEC faces continuing threats from
regulatory reform. If the Obama Plan (as modified by the House) is enacted,
the Financial Services Oversight Council’s role as a systemic risk regulator
might allow the Federal Reserve and Executive Branch agencies to eclipse the
SEC as the primary securities market regulator. The proposed Consumer
Financial Protection Agency (“CFPA”) could also trample on the SEC’s
traditional terrain. If the CFPA emerges as an effective consumer advocate, it
could conceivably absorb part of the SEC’s investor protection role. The
agency’s survival depends to a large extent on whether it can restore
credibility and public trust in the coming years.
V. CONCLUSION
The SEC’s stature as a regulatory agency has suffered in recent years due
to external constraints and its own internal failings. The financial collapse and
pending reforms create an occasion to critically assess the agency’s past and
evaluate its prospects for the future. Despite its many problems, the SEC is
likely to continue to play a pivotal role in financial regulation. Reform efforts
should therefore focus on preserving broad SEC authority, ensuring strong
leadership, and allocating resources commensurate to the agency’s broad
ranging responsibilities.
